

Revisiting the Early Islamic Social Strata: A Case Study of the *Mawlis*

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Abstract

The term Mawali in Arabic refers to non-Arab citizens considered equal to Arabs during the time of the Holy Prophet (SAW). This treatment continued during the Pious Caliphatic rule but later differentiated between Arabs and non-Arab counterparts. The first Pious Caliph continued this non-discriminatory policy, while the second caliph ensured equal treatment without discrimination. During the Umayyad period, the Mawali faced threats, including the Umayyad clan's capture of the Caliphatic slot and Muslim armies. Umayyad governors faced discrimination, leading to disenchantment and instability. Despite some breaches, the overall treatment was humane, with the Islamic idea of equality applying to all.

Keywords: *Mawali, non-Arab, Holy Prophet (SAW), Pious, Caliph*

Introduction

The term *Mawali* in Arabic refers to non-Arab citizens, who were considered equal to Arabs in every respect during the time of the Holy Prophet (SAW). This traditional treatment continued during the Pious Caliphatic rule, but later used to differentiate between Arabs and non-Arab counterparts. The first Pious Caliph continued this non-discriminatory policy, while the second caliph ensured equal treatment to all Arabs and non-Arabs without discrimination. The second caliph followed Arab tribes for financial reasons, such as the Banu Tamim tribe, and consulted al-Hurmuzan on various occasions. However, he was strict on equal treatment for *Mawali* but also sought to separate them from Arabs.

During the Umayyad period, the *Mawali* faced threats, including the Umayyad clan's capture of the Caliphatic slot, which led to a surge in *Mawali* numbers due to ongoing conquests and Muslim armies. The Arabs were supremacists, calling others al-Hamra or the red, due to their genetic superiority complex. The Umayyad governors in the Persian Empire faced discrimination against the *Mawali* population, leading to their disenchantment and the absence of stability and peace during their rule. Governors like Qutaiba subjected the *Mawali* to harsh treatment, such as putting them to swords.

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Some Umayyad caliphs and governors took reasonable policy measures towards the *Mawali* section, employing them for statecraft and entrusting them with important responsibilities. Some governors, such as Hajjaj bin Abdul Aziz, treated the *Mawali* faction kindly, such as appointing them governors, banning gifts on festivals, exoneration from poll-tax, and including them in the pension register.

Despite some breaches by certain governors, the overall treatment meted out to the *Mawali* was humane, with the Islamic idea of equality applying to all regardless of race, region, or ethnicity. The Pious Caliphatic period was beneficial for the *Mawali* due to proximity to the Holy Prophet and equal treatment in Allah's eyes. The Umayyad period raised treatment standards for the *Mawali*, but not limited to their treatment, as seen with Hajjaj bin Yousuf and Ubaydallah bin Ziyad.

The *Mawali*

Originally the *Mawali* or *al-Mawali* as it is used in Arabic language means non-Arab or having no Arab origin. Its singular is *Mawla*. The major purpose of the reference to *Mawali* is to highlight the gubernatorial policies concerning the *Mawali* and their positive and negative impacts on the overall Islamic governments of those times. Therefore, a cursory review of these people and their social organisation needs to be dealt with through the lens of the theoretical perspective as propounded by the Holy Prophet (SAW) and his followers, including the leading jurists and religious scholars during their lifetime regarding the governance principles of equality between all the citizens through the historical records and events as recorded in the history. The treatment meted out to such citizens during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet (SAW) was, in most cases, exemplary sans racial, ethnic, or prejudicial discrimination. His policy was based on the equality of all sans any connection, link, or relations ^[1].

Islam has provided a very powerful concept of brotherhood amongst all Muslims disregarding any discriminatory elements; be it tribe, ethnicity, or family. *Mawali* is equal to Arabs in every respect, and the same was the case during those times. The Holy Prophet (SAW) stressed upon the Muslims to be brothers, and live in peace, or make peace among themselves ^[2] stressing that all Muslims are brothers as William Muir has put it; "To raise the spirits of his followers thus home-sick and suffering, and to draw them into nearer relations with the Madina converts, Mahomet [Muhammad SAW] established a new fraternity between the Refugees and the Citizens"^[3]. For such a Western mind, it, indeed, seems a novel idea and it was in spirit a unique idea put forward by the Holy Prophet (SAW) that even the non-Arabs could be equal to Arabs when some non-Arabs became brothers of the Arab refugees coming to Madina from Makkah. However, this fraternity was based on the much wider concept of *Ummah*, a concept of the nation derived from religion. It was, therefore, natural for the newly appointed officials to take cues from the brotherhood and Madina and treat the non-Arabs likewise but it only stayed during the life of the Holy Prophet (SAW) ^[4].

As stated earlier, there was no discriminatory element involved in the Muslim brotherhood formed by the Holy Prophet (SAW); not even the faith or country or nationality. The faith of Islam was the binding factor. The Holy Prophet (SAW) called the Muslims the *Ummah* without any distinction between the Arabs and the *Mawali*, as it was clarified on his last pilgrimage and then the address delivered on that occasion further reinforced this concept. At that time, the Holy Prophet (SAW) removed all racial and tribal differences and discrimination among the people ^[5]. Despite the insistence of the theological underpinnings of Islam on this non-discriminatory brotherhood, it soon disappeared following his sad demise and after some years of the Pious Caliphatic period. Even modern political thinkers of Islamic jurisprudence have highlighted that there is no such distinction in the Islamic State if it is based on Shar'ia ^[6].

Contractual obligations were a safety element for a non-Arab or *Mawla* for security against tribal prejudice. It means to protect the confederate as stated in a saying of the Holy Prophet (SAW) that he asked for the protection of the *Mawali*. Also, the Holy Prophet (SAW) clarified further that a *M Mawali awla* person has the freedom to select any confederate from any tribe irrespective of his status ^[7].

The Holy Prophet (SAW), during his Madinite life, made it clear that there is a need for a Muslim to get the consent of the *Mawla* first before selecting him from any confederate, or before becoming his confederate ^[8]. For example, Zayd bin Haritha, with whom the Holy Prophet (SAW) won liberty, preferred to stay with him instead of going back to his family ^[9]. In other words, the *mawali* could win freedom and go anywhere he chooses to go, and it is equivalent to modern freedom or liberty.

In the case of reliability, the Holy Prophet (SAW) expressed full confidence in a *mawla* in any task. He appointed them to several good positions, entrusting them with responsibilities that they performed well. Zayd became an announcer, who used to give good news. He was also titled the chief when departing for the expedition to obstruct the path of the Quraishi caravan ^[10]. The fact is that the *mawali* proved as loyal as the other tribal people and showed exemplary courage in the Battle of Badr, ^[11] the first Islamic test of courage, and the Battle of Trench, the second test. Also, trench digging was an idea from a popular *mawla* of that time, Salman Farsi, who advised the Holy Prophet (SAW) to dig a trench around Madina ^[12]. They were considered equal so much so that the Holy Prophet (SAW) entrusted them with theological positions, which were considered quite sensitive. Hazrat Bilal, a slave whom the first Pious Caliph got freed from captivity, was appointed the caller for congregational prayers or muezzin ^[13]. This traditional treatment of the *mawali* continued during the pious caliphatic rule. However, during the later Caliphatic period, it started showing signs of fissures, and soon the term *mawali* began to be used for the difference between the Arabs and their non-Arab counterparts.

The first Pious Caliph continued with the Caliphatic policy of this non-discriminatory treatment, though some Muslims tried their best to plead with the first

Pious Caliph to impede the Syrian expedition led by Usama bin Zaid but he resisted and dispatched Usama to lead this expedition as ordered by the Holy Prophet (SAW) [14]. The second caliph also continued with this policy and ensured equal treatment to all the Arabs and the non-Arabs without any discrimination. Although he ensured a pension system in the army, which made a distinction between different tribes the difference between the Arabs and the *mawali* soldiers was non-existent ^[15]. He awarded 5,000 dirhams for every Badr fighter disregarding his status of being an Arab or a *mawla* ^[16].

His treatment of all slaves and free individuals was equal even during the distribution of food. The same treatment of the *mawali* is observed through the review of the then administrative machinery, for the *mawali* were in the judiciary in various cases. The legendary Qazi Shuraih was a *mawla* of Persian origin. He stayed at the helm of the affairs in Kufa for more than 50 years – a period that extends from the period of second caliph to the ruthless, Hajjaj ^[17]. It was a unique service of its kind that even the most committed foes of each other accepted Shuraih as the judicial head in Kufa and he stayed at the same post for more than five decades.

The second caliph also did not make much difference with the *mawali* when dealing with either political or even military matters. He is stated to have consulted al-Hurmuzan on various occasions such as on expeditions to Persia, Isfahan, and Azerbaijan. It is reported that it was al-Hurmuzan who advised the second caliph about the first expedition to Persia ^[18].

It shows the precedents that occurred in the temporal proximity of the second caliphate, as he had the power to stay and invite opposition in the case of violation. Therefore, the second caliph followed them in letter and spirit even in the case of alliances of the Arab tribes with the *mawali* ^[19]. This was between the Banu Tamim tribe and the *mawali*, which according to Wellhausen, led to the strength of the tribe ^[20].

However, Baladhuri's opinion is about the tribe being linked to the Holy Prophet (SAW), ^[21] the reason that they followed the precedent in letter and spirit. However, there seems to be another aspect that they joined the Banu Tamim for financial reasons; for finance was at that time a new aspect of a rising empire and the Banu Tamim had been a martial race, serving the Islamic polity from its beginning and getting huge sums as pensions, and the former wanted to get that share or saw getting higher pensions by aligning with the Tamimites. Baladhuri mentions this stipend amounting to almost a million dirhams ^[22].

It happened that the Aswiran, the cavalry serving the Persian emperor, seceded to the Muslim governor, Abu Musa, after he captured Tustar ^[23] thus ending the Persian rule over that region. A treaty was signed by the governor Abu Musa with them to swear allegiance to the Islamic polity that the second caliph ratified. Their condition for accepting Islam was to get salaries equal to other soldiers with the freedom to align with the tribe and fight only against the non-Arabs ^[24]. Some other

tribes of Indian genealogy, too, followed the Aswira example, such as the az-Zutt as well as the al-Sayabiha ^[25].

By siding with the fourth caliph, the people of the Sayabiha and the Zutt proved their loyalty to the caliphate and joined Hazrat Ali (RA) with the Kufans for battles ^[26]. This shows that they were from the martial race, habitual of living near seas, and highly organised and natural soldiers, who served in different departments of the Islamic state in different capacities including policing, soldiering, and financial fields ^[27].

Therefore, it is interesting to note that all of these three tribes; the Zutt, the Sayabiha, and the Asawira used to receive equal pensions from the second caliph's time. Some of the governors of those times were also highly popular among the *mawalian* account of their kindness and love for them such as Mughira bin Shuba, who used to speak Persian with the *mawali* ^[28]. It has also been stated by Baladhuri about the security extended by Abu-Ubaidah to *mawali* and non-Muslims in his letter such as:

In the name of Allah, the compassionate, the merciful. This is a statement of security to so and so, son of so and so, and to the inhabitants of Ba'labakk – Greeks, Persians and Arabs – for their lives, possessions, churches and houses, inside and outside the city and also for their mills. The Greeks are entitled to give pasture to their cattle ... Whosoever of them adopts Islam, shall have the same rights as we and be bound by the same obligations ^[29].

This was the time of the second caliph when Abu 'Ubaida bin al-Jarah attacked Ba'labakk. It shows that the second caliph, being close to the Prophetic time, was still strict on equal treatment to *mawali*. However, the specific strategies of the caliph are also suggestive of his being intending to separate them from the Arabs. For example, of the newest cities such as al-Fustat, Basra, and Kufa were logistic military camps for invasions with instructions to the soldiers not to join ranks with the *mawali* or the non-Arabs.

It is also stated that Hazrat Umar (RA) did not want the *mawali* to mix with the Arabs and fixed their stipend less than that of their Arab counterparts ^[30]. That is why he always insisted on keeping Madina as a capital city inaccessible to the *mawali* people from the non-Arab regions. When Mughira sent his *mawali*, Abu Lulu Firoz, to Madina, he had to send for the caliphatic permission to let him enter the city [31] which later threatened the caliph and martyred him during a conspiracy ^[32]. This is conclusively a distinction made at the caliphatic instructions and this continued during the period of the second caliph.

Although it seems to be a deeply discriminatory attitude, yet it is hard to admit the openness that the caliphatic period, at times, showered on the *mawali*, even though this cost the life of the second caliph. It has been observed that the *mawali* did not win the full Arab recognition, and it used to occur in several ways. They were

mostly in infantry and not in cavalry, were mostly observed with scepticism when it was a matter of trust and loyalty. Also, they were like part-time soldiers, for their pension was not permanent and their names were not registered in the *Diwan* (Register for Pension) ^[33].

Despite a warm welcome to them in the Arab tribal customary fashion, they were still considered crude rural people; a type of people living apart from the tribes ^[34]. However, these small and seemingly imperceptible fissures began to widen during the period of Hazrat Usman (RA), when some Arabs wished that the *mawali* should get less share in their pension ^[35]. However, the fourth caliph strictly advised his governors to be positive about their policies towards the *mawali* ^[36].

Ibn Abihi became very popular among the *mawali* for his treatment of them when he was governing al-Fars during Hazrat Ali's (RA) caliphatic rule. The Persians used to shower huge applause on him. Although the Umayyad period posed some grave threats to the *mawali*, the situation was not as grave as painted by some modern European historians ^[37]. The *mawali*, for example, was brought to villages to be made civilised during the time of Hajjaj. Therefore, the policy prevalent during the Umayyad period had two major aspects as follows.

When the Umayyad clan captured the Caliphatic slot, the *mawali* numbers skyrocketed at once due to ongoing conquests and regions falling to the Muslim armies waging war against the adjoining countries. The governors were sending a huge number of all types of slaves back to the capital city ^[38]. The situation was that the caliphs used to distribute those slaves to their friends, aides, and helpers; while some slaves, having some professional ability or skill, became a special type of *mawali* ^[39]. Some others contracted client-hood with prominent Muslim families or tribal chiefs. As soon as their number increased due to more conquests their increasing number was threatening the Muslim populace.

The Arabs were supremacists, not only in theological dimensions but also in sociological perspectives. This was natural to them, the reason for calling others al-Hamra or the red which means people of different races of tribes. It was their genetic superiority complex that the Arabs were born to rule. During the period of Amir Muawia *mawla* and an Arab were involved in a brawl in Iraq when Abdullah bin Amir, the governor, was present. When the *mawla* demanded one thing, the Arabs demanded many in response, saying that the *mawla* do their petty jobs such as mending shoes and clothes and cleaning streets ^[40]. This shows how the supremacist realisation was steeped in their genetics. During the later Umayyad period, this wave of prejudicial treatment of the *mawali* even went further when Hajjaj bin Yusuf assumed the charge of the governor of Iraq. The *mawali* faced humiliation during this Umayyad rule under Hajjaj's governorship, and he announced it from the Kufan mosque's pulpit ^[41]. He introduced in thunderous terms, saying that he had never left any undone and that now the crops of heads are almost ready ^[42]. Although the Iraqi peasants reached the caliph to complain against Hajjaj's ruthlessness the survival of Hajjaj despite this

cruelty points to the caliphatic vision of giving much importance to the role and position of governors.

The Basarian residents, too, suffered the rage of Hajjaj in that with a handful of Syrian soldiers, he managed to massacre thousands of Basarians, for it was due to the reduction in the Basarian pension that infuriated the public with the *mawali* strongly backing the revolt. However, the fury of Hajjaj witnessed no limitations. He made them flee and settled the issue of the *mawali* uprisings for good. He dispersed them to stay in rural areas around Basra and other cities. Each individual was branded with the village name on his body so that he could not leave it ^[43].

To suppress their resistance further, he imposed *jizya* even on the convert *mawali* ^[44]. This crushing Hajjajian drive continued with popular clients such as Firoz, who joined hands with Ibn al-Ash to revolt against Hajjaj for 10,000 dirhams, but after facing defeat, fled to Khurasan, who was later arrested and slaughtered ^[45]. O'Leary relates that Hajjaj had an inborn hostility towards the *mawali* and took strong action against them and crushed them ruthlessly for uttering even a single word against the tribal barriers ^[46].

He also resorted to extreme and harsh measures of devastating homes, cutting off pensions, and expelling the Basarian *mawali* from the main city to settle in the rural areas for their support to Ibn al-Ashath ^[47].

However, it is a fact that such measures do not follow the spirit of Islamic precedents left by the Holy Prophet (SAW) and followed by the Caliphatic traditions in letter and spirit. On the whole, other Umayyad governors, too, followed Hajjaj's set precedents and turned towards the *mawali* threat, or at least, they considered them a threat. For example, the Khurasani governor, Qutaiba, subjected the *mawali* to harsh treatment, as Tabari states, adding that Qutaiba complied with Hajjaj's command of putting them to swords ^[48].

This condition was not just prevalent in Iraq or Khurasan; this treatment was rather pandemic. For example, Yazid bin Muslim, who was appointed governor by the caliph Yazid bin Abdul Malik, subjected the martial race of Berbers to persecution and torture ^[49]. Baladhuri records that Yazid, when posted as the African governor, branded the hands of his Berber guards. This led to a permanent intransigence in them, which resulted in a bloody revolt concluding in his assassination ^[50]. This contemptuous attitude of the Umayyad governors led to the disenchantment of the *mawali* segment of the population so much so that the entire Umayyad period could neither witness stability nor peace in the Persian part of the empire throughout their rule. Some of the anti-*mawali* actions of the governors given below demonstrate this biased gubernatorial attitude in different fields including the economic, military, and social.

The bias of the Umayyad governors could be observed from the simple issue of the imposition of *jizya* in that they imposed it on the *mawali*. A *mawla* used to get less pension than his Arab counterpart ^[51].

They also used to migrate to the Arab towns to build a huge suburban part of it by settling around the cities. Most of them comprise the artists, traders, shopkeepers, and other professionals who used to serve the Arab aristocratic families living in the cities ^[52]. Therefore, it was their usual hatred against them due to these petty professions, or as the Arabs considered them.

Despite claims of the religion that all Muslims are equal, the *mawali* used to face discrimination even in the military service despite their utility, while most were inducted in infantry and not cavalry. Even with victories, most of the *mawali* were not given their due share from the war booty, even if they were entitled to the Islamic injunctions ^[53]. This exploitation extended to the administration, too, where the *mawali* were never employed or were employed only for a few menial jobs ^[54]. Social and religious discrimination, too, became a basis for the exploitation of *mawali*. For example, a local Arab mostly disliked being led by a *mawla* prayer leader. The Arabs, while doing this, even, later, confessed to having committed this action of insult ^[55].

The social custom of calling them through patronymic titles was abolished after attributing sobriquets to them. A *mawla* was not permitted to walk or live in the proximity of the Arabs or the Arab processions. They were not invited on purely Arab feasts, and if they were, they were served after the Arab guests but that too by their knowledge, merit and age. Then, they were made to sit outside the feasting building or in the passages where the serving waiters used to serve them. They were not allowed to pray at the funeral of their dead ones in the presence of the Arabs ^[56]. A marriage of a *mawla* and an Arab lady was considered a horrible incompatibility ^[57] with an Umayyad law slapping a ban on such marriages and forcing the *mawali* to divorce the Arab women, in case, they had contracted one. It happened with the people of the tribe of the Banu Sulaim in the town of Rauha. It was suggested that the marriages could be consummated between the *mawali* and the tribal people, but when the Madinite governor came to know about this issue, he ordered the *mawali* be whipped two hundred times after shaving their eyebrows, heads, and beards to humiliate them for this crime. This *mawali* resentment is stated to be the foundation of ousting the Umayyads from power.

Despite these negative policies, and exploitation in different sectors, fields, and aspects, the Umayyad caliphs and some of the governors took reasonably good policy measures towards the *mawali* section, employing them for statecraft. Even Amir Muawia and Hajjaj left some good examples, which demonstrated that they tried, to some extent, to employ them and use their capabilities where they found them appropriate. Some of them were entrusted with important responsibilities. For example, during his gubernatorial rule in Syria, Amir Muawia (RA) continued with the pensions of the *mawali* paid to them during the rule of the third caliph though it was low ^[58]. In some cases, he fixed a stipend for some people around 15 dirhams per head ^[59]. As an astute strategist, he understood their military significance and moved several of them to the regions of the Zutt and the Sayabijah ^[60].

From their professional expertise in shipping, it seems that they used to work for the Islamic naval forces to safeguard the Syrian ports and coastal areas [61]. He also manipulated their expertise in the financial administration and appointed Abdullah bin Darraj for *kharaj* collection in Iraq [62]. Abdullah proved his decision correct by reclaiming the Batiha lands for Amir Muawia (RA), which used to produce five million worth of yield every year [63]. Witnessing this good treatment of the *mawali* faction, the governors, too, followed the precedents. Specifically, bin Abihi used them for the *kharaj* collection [64].

He continued with using educated *mawali* for communication [65]. Tabari records that Ibn Ziyad employed 2,000 *mawali* archers to Basra as his security guards [66].

However, the case of Egypt was not different. Amr bin al-As used *mawali* administrators for very good purposes. Al-Baladhuri records that Amr used Wardan for *kharaj* collection in Egypt, for once Amir Muawia (RA) is stated to have written him an order to increase *kharaj* on the Copt Christians, though he refused on the ground of having a non-increase tax treaty with them [67]. Baladhuri also refers to the Wardan market in Egypt adding that he used to write peace treaties between the conquered Egyptians and the governor, Ibn al-As [68]. Some of the *mawali* also attained caliphatic trust and became governors during Amir Muawia's time. Amir Muawia appointed a *mawla*, Masalma bin Mukhallad, to Egypt and Abu al-Muhajir, as the governor of Africa [69]. It means that governors also had a free hand to choose capable *mawali* and assign them responsibilities.

In mid-between, two Umayyad governors treated the *mawali* faction kindly. Hajjaj, though deeply hostile to this *mawali* phenomenon as he considered it, was quite dependent on them in various governmental measures. He used them for administration such as Salih bin Abdur Rahman, who used to work for the Banu Tamim, became Hajjaj's Deputy. He was adept in Persian and Arabian languages and worked on *Dawawin* for the *kharaj* collection (Tax Registers) to turn it from the Persian language to the Arabic language. Hajjaj also used the *mawali*, the Marshes (called Kasker) in the az-Zutt region for agricultural growth for they had herds of buffaloes [70].

There was another skill in which the *mawali* were dexterous. They were popular and great versifiers and poets and won due respect from the Umayyad governors for this skill. Nusayb bin Rabah, a *mawla* in service of Abdul Aziz bin Marwan, the Egyptian governor during the time of Abdul Malik bin Marwan, won admiration for his great skills in writing poetry [71].

Abdul Aziz rewarded him, praising him as one of the best at that time, which incentivised him to poeticise other influential figures, too. Seeing these qualities of the *mawali*, some other governors, too paid attention to this huge chunk of the capable people. Yazid bin al-Muhallab, an Iraqi governor, was famous for his pro-*mawali* views [72].

He also relied heavily on the *mawali* support in his military adventures. It is stated that he used Haiyan, a *mawla* and client of Miskala, for a peace treaty with Tabaristan. It is stated that Haiyan was captured by al-Daylam after a great struggle and he proved such a great glib tongue telling them “I am one of you, even if religion has separated us” after which he succeeded in roping in the *Isbahbadh* for peace treaty with Yazid ^[73].

However, when it comes to Umar bin Abdul Aziz, which is stated as the golden Umayyad period, it was beneficial for the *mawali*. J. Wellhausen is all praise for Umar II for his pro-*mawali* policy ^[74] saying that the caliph appointed them governors, banned gifts on festivals, exonerated them from poll-tax and included them in the pension register along with further redressal of excesses committed against them from time to time. Wellhausen writes:

Umar II’s sentiments made him adopt another way. His aim was not so very much different from that of Hajjaj as mentioned earlier], but he tried to reach it only in a way that did not offend against the Islamic idea of justice. Thus he agreed with the old way in this respect, that a Muslim whether of first or second rank, whether Arab or Maula, needs to pay no tribute, either pol-tax or land tax ^[75].

Despite some breaches by certain governors, the overall treatment meted out to the *mawali* was humane. The Islamic idea of equality applies to all disregard of race, region or ethnicity. There are several other such instances in which the *mawali* faction met a humane treatment that won their hearts. When Hisham bin Abdul Malik was caliph, Khalid bin Abdullah al-Qaisari won the hearts of the *mawali* as the *kharaj* collectors and the locals resented when he was replaced with Yusuf bin Umar ^[76].

Perhaps, the first caliph having non-Arab maternal lineage was Yazid bin Walid, whose mother is stated to be from the lineage of Yazdgird, the last Persian emperor. When he appointed Abdullah bin Umar as the Iraqi governor, who followed his father in dealing with the *mawali* on equal footing the Syrian soldiers and officials felt resentment, though, the *mawali* were all praise for Ibn Umar ^[77]. This section shows how the gubernatorial role was of critical importance when it came to social engineering, social stability, and social organisation of the existing social structure. Regarding the *mawali* social faction, the Pious Caliphatic period and Umayyad dynastic rule had some differences, but the later Umayyad governors excelled in bringing the *mawali* faction into the Islamic mainstream by extending equal treatment to them. In other words, this entire period was observed sometimes making them uplift their souls and status after winning equal treatment, while at other times during the initial Umayyad period, they faced wholesale persecution. The time has never been constant to them. However, there is no denying the fact that the *mawali* faction played a critical role in the building of an Islamic polity during every caliphatic period.

The Pious Caliphatic period was very benign for the *mawali* on account that it was in proximity to the Holy Prophet (SAW), who announced the brotherhood during the migration to Madina. Therefore, it was ingrained in the theological foundations of the Islamic polity that all are equal in the eyes of Allah. The *mawali* also proved it during the Prophetic period during the period of crisis such as the Battle of Trench.

Although the Caliphatic period, too, was benign, there was a slight difference. It crept up due to the traditional Arab prejudice existing in the tribes for centuries, for *mawali* were still considered slaves. ^[78]

The second caliph, however, did not make much difference except in the case of alliances as they were allied as soldiers for “stipends”. Even then *mawali* were not allowed to enter, though, permission during the time of the second caliph secured by Al-Mughira bin Shu’bah led to the martyrdom of the second caliph, Hazrat Umar (RA). This was because some were fake *mawali* like the assassin of the second caliph who knowingly let him enter on the recommendation of a great follower, Mughira bin Shuba. Therefore, it was natural that *mawali* lost their mark in the eyes of the Hijazi public but when the Umayyad Dynasty came to the helm of the affairs, the situation hanged in balance, for Amir Muawia (RA) used some *mawali* and mistrusted some. The whole situation was entirely anti-*mawali* yet there were some incidents where *mawali* rose to power such as Ibn Abihi, whom Amir Muawia (RA) turned into an Arab through a caliphatic decree. This inequality although continued but ebbed somewhat during the later period when the boundaries of the Umayyad Empire extended towards the east and the west. In this connection, the progress of the *mawali* was tremendous specifically during the last days of the Umayyad period and before the Abbasides took over the empire. All in all, the Umayyad period raised the bars of treatment toward *mawali* during the heydays as Wellhausen has significantly mentioned the period of Umar bin Abdul Aziz, a landmark happening for the *mawali* in the Islamic polity. However, it could be stated that though the Caliphatic governors were bound to follow the centre in their treatment to this faction of the population, the Umayyad period was not bound. The thrust of the treatment by the Umayyad governors was the consolidation of the Umayyad rule rather than the theological transparency or social justice propounded by the Holy Prophet (SAW) as the treatment of the governors in Iraq and Persian region shows. Specifically, the example of Hajjaj bin Yousuf, Ubaydallah bin Ziyad, and their subordinates are cases in point.

Conclusion

The term *Mawali* refers to non-Arab citizens who have no Arab origin and were treated exemplarily during the lifetime of the Holy Prophet (SAW). Islam provided a powerful concept of brotherhood among all Muslims, disregarding any discrimination. *Mawali* were considered equal to Arabs in every respect, and the Holy Prophet (SAW) made it clear that a Muslim must get the consent of the *Mawla* before selecting them from any confederate or becoming their confederate.

The first Pious Caliph continued with the non-discriminatory policy, while the second caliph ensured equal treatment to all Arabs and non-Arabs without any discrimination. The same treatment was observed in the administrative machinery, with the legendary Qazi Shuraih staying at the helm of affairs in Kufa for over 50 years. The second caliphate had the power to stay and invite opposition in case of violation, leading to alliances between Arab tribes and the *Mawali*. During the Umayyad period, the *Mawali* population surged due to ongoing conquests and Muslim armies. Governors distributed slaves to friends, aides, and helpers, with some becoming special types of *Mawali*. The Arabs were known for their supremacist nature, which led to the Arab-Muslim conflict in Iraq, where the *Mawali* tribe was subjected to humiliation and forced to perform petty jobs.

Despite these negative policies and exploitation, some Umayyad caliphs and governors took reasonable policy measures towards the *Mawali* section, employing them for statecraft. In Egypt, Amr bin al-As used *Mawali* administrators for various purposes, and some *Mawali* also gained caliphatic trust and became governors during Amir Muawia's time. The *Mawali* faction in the Islamic polity faced humane treatment during the Pious Caliphatic period and Umayyad dynastic rule. The Islamic idea of equality applied to all, regardless of race, region, or ethnicity. The Umayyad period, marked by Umar bin Abdul Aziz's landmark role in Islamic polity, emphasised the *Mawali's* rights but prioritised consolidating Umayyad rule over theological transparency and social justice.

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